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Abstract
In this article I show how to obtain a powerful and truthful explanation
of the failure of sorites arguments combining an adaptation of the Wide Set
Theory formulated by Formato and Gerla and the concept of deep many-
valuedness established by Marraud. It is shown that if the premises of a
sorites argument are conceived as a succession of indexed consequence opera-
tors (where indices express the accuracy of the inferences) prefixing sentences,
the argument fails because the transitive property for the inclusion between
wide data sets is not always maintained.
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1 Introduction
One of the most recent and interesting set-theoretic creations is Wide Set Theory
(cf. [3]). In a general sense, a wide set is a finite set as big as we want it to be.
Given a binary predicate EQ interpreted as a multivalued extension of the typical
relation of equipotence between sets, the notion of infinite set may be modelized
by a fuzzy subset representing the class of (finite) wide sets. Wide Set Theory is
the ZF theory without the infinity axiom, and adding axioms which establish the
fact that EQ represents an equivalence relation plus the following axioms:
1. (EQ(X, X∪{X})∧(X⊆Y))→ EQ(Y, Y∪{Y}) (monotonicity),
2. ¬EQ(∅, ∅∪{∅}) (∅ is not infinite)
3. ∃X EQ(X, X∪{X}) (infinity axiom)
The authors of this axiomatization demonstrate the existence of a model asso-
ciated with a function eq: N × N →[0,1] which is the correlate of EQ such that
(for an interpretation I), I(EQ)(X,Y)=eq(card(X),card(Y)). But more fundamen-
tal to our aim is the fact that on page 383 of their article they declare that sorites
paradoxes are based on the notion of wide sets. Because this, in fact, is the main
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objective of our work: to explain the actual genesis and failure of this kind of
arguments using the mighty construction of Formato and Gerla. In order to do
this, I vividly recommend reading their original writings, as only in this way the
reader will understand to what degree our “solution” owes itself to the tools em-
ployed by the Italian logicians. Another source of influence is to be found in the
idea of deep many-valuedness developed by Marraud and Pelta (see [8],[10]). Until
now the construction of superficial many-valued logics, that is, logics with an arbi-
trary number (bigger than two) of truth-values but always incorporating a binary
consequence relation, has prevailed in investigations on logical many-valuedness.
According to Marraud many-valuedness has been excluded from the consequence
operation and the metalogic of a logical system, although its object language may
be many-valued. Many authors are pleased to hold the existence of logics with a
number bigger than two of truth-values but in which sentences of the kind “Sn+1
follows from S1,. . . ,Sn” only can take the assignation of two truth-values. This
is why Marraud speaks of deep many-valued logics, that is, many-valued logics in
which the consequence relation is n>2-ary. He propounds graded systems of se-
quents (GSS) (cf. [8]) which, by mixing different consequence relations (in a similar
style to the labelled deductive systems of Dov Gabbay [4], although Gabbay only
uses labels for formulas), express the concept of deep many-valuedness. For a given
ordered set < I,≤ >, a graded system of sequents would have rules of the form
X1`i Y1,. . . ,Xn`j Yn
X`k Y
with i,j,k∈I being the subindices joined to the symbols of assertion and interpreted
as meaning accuracy of the inferences. This system does not define a unique con-
sequence relation but a family of them, although its definitions can be dependent
between them. In a similar vein, Pavelka [9] was the first author introducing the
concept of fuzzy consequence operator extending the notion of consequence opera-
tor in Tarski’s sense; Chakraborty [2] used Fuzzy Set Theory for obtaining graded
consecuence in many-valued logic while Castro and Trillas [1] develop an approach,
which using fuzzy consequence operators, allows to explain the break of transitivity
in argument chains that include vague predicates.
Given an initial set of data D={`1A1,. . . ,`1An}, for every i∈I, it is convenient
to introduce:
Ci(D)={B: `j B, for some j≥i, is GSS-provable from D}.
If 1 is the maximally trustworthy item of I and 0 is the minimally trustworthy
element, then it is obvious that C1(D)⊆. . .⊆C0(D), expressing the relative inclu-
sion of the sets Ci(D) that the quantity of information provable from the set D
of premises grows when the control of accuracy of the inferences is relaxed. Thus
the point of equilibrium between initial information and accuracy of the reasoning
would be the least i∈I where Ci(D) is consistent.
Let us consider the following sorites argument (see [8, p. 64]):
1. Whoever is fifteen years old is young
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2. Whoever is one month older than a young person is young
.
.
` Whoever is ninety years old is young
There are strategies for solving sorites arguments that resolve out the difficulty
on the basis of the gradual character of the assertion of truth of fuzzy predicates
such as young (see [5]), in this example. Nevertheless, from a deeply many-valued
perspective the matter is not that the second premise in the argument is less true
(with a determined degree of truth) than the first one: it happens that the second
sentence displays a different consequence relation, that is, a weaker consequence
relation. And so the second premise could be paraphrased as saying that “it is
provable (more weakly than the proved by the first one) that one who is fifteen years
plus one month old is young unless new contradictory information (consistency
criterion) is introduced”. Any reader can appreciate in this formulation a certain
similarity with the prototype of a defeasible rule.
Let us consider data sets incorporating a determined consequence operator and
being small theories. Let a database D={A1, A2, A3,. . . ,An} closed under a conse-
quence relation C1 so that C1(D)={`1A1, `1A2,. . . ,`1An}. In a simplified man-
ner, we will consider a merely quantitative criterion (the number of premises con-
tained) for distinguishing between databases closed under consequence relations: a
theory C1(D) is more trustworthy than a theory C2(D) if and only if the quantity
of information derivable from D is bigger under C2, that is, C2 is more lax than
C1. If, e.g., D={Whoever is fifteen years old is young},
C1(D)={`1Whoever is fifteen years plus one month old is young}; if C2 is
applied then C2C1(D)={`1Whoever is fifteen years old is young, `2`1Whoever is
fifteen years plus one month old is young}. In this case, the premise “Whoever
is fifteen years old is young” is the basis for the weaker deduction C2. In a more
general sense a continuum of degrees of accuracy covering the threshold [0,1] is
taken into account so that C1(D) would be the strongest theory and C0(D) would
be the weakest theory (the theory with more defeasible consequences when new
information is added).
2 Applying Wide Set Theory to sorites arguments
Let I =< I, ≤ > be a structure where I 6= ∅, i∈I; there is a function f: I→[0,1] and
≤ is a partial order for indices belonging to I. Let g be a function such that g=h(f),
being h: [0,1]→ C, where C is a set of consequence operators `0,. . . ,`1. Let D
a data set and Ci(D) a data theory. Two consequence operations `i and `j are
extensionally equivalent if and only if they close data sets of the same cardinality,
that is, `i≡`j, iff card(Ci(Di))=card(Cj(Dj)).
Data theories Ci(Di) are collected in partition classes of an equivalence relation
induced because consequence operators are extensionally equivalent.
So, `i≡`i (reflexivity),
(`i≡`j)→ (`j≡`i) (symmetry),
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and ((`i≡`j)∧(`j≡`k))→ (`i≡`k) (transitivity).
We are going to define the idea of degree of extensional equivalence between
consequence operators (deec). In order to do so, first of all we define a function
dee of degree of extensional equivalence:
dee: N × N →[0,1], where the domain of the function is the Cartesian product
of data sets. Actually, dee is a typical measure of the fuzzy set theory (see e.g.
[6] for an excellent comparison between fuzzy equivalence relations and pseudo-
metrics) but we now adapt it for relating sets of sentences closed under conse-
quence operators taking into account the cardinality of the sets. The degree of
correlation between `i and `j is given by the difference of cardinality between Di
and Dj. The more distance of cardinality between sets the more difference in the
accuracy of the generated consequences from Di and Dj. Therefore, deec(Ci(Di),
Cj(Dj))=dee(card(Di),card(Dj)).
According to the operations traditionally defined on t-norms (see [3], [11]), we
can give a quantitative interpretation for dee: for m,n∈ N, and it is supposed that
card(Di)=m and card(Dj)=n, it happens that dee(m,n)=min[m,n]/max[m,n]. It is
possible to introduce a contextual function c for the measure dee so that, according
to the nature of the premises of the argument, fix more or less conventionally the
degree of separation between premises with respect to their derivational accuracy:
deec(m,n)=dee(m,n)c; c acts as a parameter for reflecting the influence of the
context on the variation of the measure. If c takes a conventional value then
dee(m,n)c=(min[m,n]/max[m,n])c. But do not forget that we want to apply these
measures to lax theories closed by consequence operators Cn+1 from theories closed
by operators Cn. That is, what I want to say is that sorites arguments have an
argumentative structure similar to the form of a waterfall (if the reader accepts
this metaphor): premises “spurt” from a given one to the next one, seemingly
without a break. Certainly this is the key perspective of this essay and nothing
better for reflecting it that the introduction of a function of measure ws adapted
directly of the definition of wide set (see [3]). So, we have ws(n)=dee(n,n+1) and al-
ways considering the quantitative definition of dee(m,n)=min[m,n]/max[m,n], then
ws(n)=min[n,n+1]/max[n,n+1] and ws(n)=n/n+1. If the parameter indicating
context is used, we have ws(n)=(n/n+1)c. Following Formato and Gerla [3, p.
385], definitional properties of our measures dee and ws would be:
1. ws(0)=0,
2. dee(m,m)=1
3. dee(m,n)=dee(n,m)
4. dee(m,n)≥dee(m,q)•dee(q,n),
5. limn ws(n)=1,
6. ws(n) is a monotonic function on N.
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3 Some aspects of Williamson’s solution
In his book entitled Vagueness, Williamson (cf. [12]) proposes an epistemic “solu-
tion” to sorites paradox. I so not wish to evaluate here its conceptual framework
based upon the path sketched by Sorensen which subordinates the knowledge of
an entity ei (Kei) to the truth of its precedent ei-1. But I shall be interested in
the question of the failure of the transitive property for the conditional connective
suggested by Williamson because it is related to our ideas about the failure of the
transitivity for sets of premises of sorites arguments conceived like wide sets or
data sets unfolded like the water of a cascade.
On page 123 of Vagueness, Williamson presents the following pattern of a sorites
argument (being the symbol “→” by the conditional):
p0 (a totally true premise)
p0→p1
p1→p2. . .
p99.999→p100.000
p100.000 (a totally false conclusion)
Of course, the degree of truth of pn decreases in an almost imperceptible way.
Williamson does not see the structure of the argument as a chain of progressively
weaker consequences, but he reduces the matter to consider the degree of truth
of the conditionals integrating the premises. The degree of truth of each premise
exerts influence over the application of the rule of modus ponens (MP) which is
not already totally valid. There are clues confirming that the author is worried
not only by the traditional perspective based on the notion of truth, and he con-
cedes importance to the idea of inferential validity. So, on page 124 of his essay,
he suggests a fuzzy measure β-(1-α) of validity for degree β of the premises and
for a degree α of the conclusion. Nevertheless, on the same page 124, Williamson
wonders about the fulfilment of the transitive property by the conditional. Because
it is obvious that transitivity is broken when the conditional premises are chained
to consequents acting like almost totally true antecedents but finishing in a to-
tally false consequent. Thus, quasi-truth is not transitively preserved by enchained
conditionals. We think that a more precise explanation of this phenomenon is to
be found in locating the failure of the transitivity on the inclusion between sets
of premises conceived as sets of sentences prefixed by consequence operations and
having progressively weaker or more defeasible indices of accuracy to the presence
of new information (conceived as enunciative items) added. By this means, we wish
to construct a model for data sets D closed by consequence operators. This model
will be adapted to the pattern of a sorites argument.
4 Failure of transitivity in sorites arguments
Let us introduce a new relation GEE (graded extensional equivalence) so that it
holds the following properties (correlates of the properties for EQ in [3, p. 384]):
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1. GEE(Ci(D),Ci(D)) (reflexivity),
2. (GEE(Ci(D),Cj(D’)))→(GEE(Cj(D’),Ci(D))) (symmetry),
3. (GEE(Ci(D),Cj(D’))∧GEE(Cj(D’),Ck(D”)))→(GEE(Ci(D), Ck(D”))) (tran-
sitivity)
4. (D≡D’)→((GEE(Ci(D),Ci(D”)))↔GEE(Ci(D’),Ci(D”))) (compatibility).
We expect that the model reflects the behaviour “in cascade” of the sorites for
data theories and by this reason we establish the existence of a wide set such that
it holds GEE(Ci(D),Ci(D)∪{Ci(D)}). Naturally, the empty set of data does not
hold the requisite. Besides I add and prove the property of inclusion between data
sets closed under consequence:
(GEE(Ci(D),Ci(D)∪{Ci(D)})∧(Ci(D)⊆Cj(D’)))→(GEE(Cj(D’),Cj(D’)∪
∪{Cj(D’)})).
Proof. Let M =<C(D),I> be a model in which C(D) is the class of data sets closed
by consequence relations and let I be the function of interpretation on the struc-
ture. I(GEE) is the degree of extensional equivalence and I(GEE)(Ci(D),Cj(D’))
expresses the grade of extensional equivalence existing between theories Ci(D) and
Cj(D’). For every Ci(D)∈C(D), I(GEE)(Ci(D),Ci(D)∪{Ci(D)}) is understood as
the degree of unfold of Ci(D) and I(GEE)(C(D)) is the class of unfolded data sets
under the consequence operator of the argument.
I(GEE)(Ci,Cj)=deec(Ci,Cj)=dee(card(Di),card(Dj)) and ws(n)=dee(n,n+1), dee
being a measure of extensional equivalence and ws a measure of the unfold of a
data set closed under consequence relation. We conclude that M satisfies
(GEE(Ci(D),Ci(D)∪{Ci(D)})∧(Ci(D)⊆Cj(D’)))→GEE(Cj(D’),Cj(D’)∪
∪{Cj(D’)}) iff dee(card(D),card(D∪{D}))≤ dee(card(D’),card(D’∪
∪{D’})), for every D⊆D’, iff ws(n) is a monotonic function on N.
We can get an interpretation for the inclusion between data sets (⊆D) us-
ing the approach of Kosko based on conditional probability (see [7]) by setting:
I(⊆D)(D,D’)=card(D∩D’)/card(D), for every D6= ∅.
(⊆D)(D,D’) can be denotated as GEE(Ci(D)∩Cj(D’),Ci(D)) because in classical
set theory, D⊆D’ iff D∩D’=D. in fact, I(⊆D)(D,D’)=1 for card(D)≤card(D’); and
it is established that if card(D)≥card(D’) then I(⊆D)(D,D’)=card(D’)/card(D).
Taking into account that conditional probabilities can be seen as fuzzy measures
in the continuum determined by I(⊆D), transitivity has been broken because it does
not hold ((⊆D)(D,D’)∧(⊆D)(D’,D”))→ (⊆D)(D,D”) whenever for Ci(D), Cj(D’),
Ck(D”)∈C(D), Ci(D)∩Cj(D’) 6= ∅ and Cj(D’)∩
∩Ck(D”)6= ∅ but Ci(D)∩Ck(D”)=∅. Actually this circumstance happens with
respect to the conclusion of the sorites : it does not coincide at all with respect
to the precedent neighbouring consequents. So it is explained that while the grade
of accuracy of the first application of `1 is absolute, the grade of accuracy of the
last turnstile is null, that is, the expression of the greatest derivational laxness.
This is the proper understanding of the derivational failure of sorites arguments
conceived as arguments by a succession or chain of consequence operators, each
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one generating weaker or more defeasible theories than the precedent ones. And
with this explanation my aim has been to offer a deeply many-valued version of
that kind of problematic arguments.
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